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Abstract 
 
This study addresses the question to what extent independent media contributes to 
government accountability, in particular the social accountability of governments in 
service delivery. It does so by analysing the effect of the production and use of 
independent media on service delivery in health care and education, and on democracy, 
in developing countries. The study finds that press freedom has an effect on democracy 
but not on service delivery, whereas civic activism, a measure for the use of independent 
media, has an effect on service delivery, but not on democracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For information about this report, please contact the lead author: staveren@iss.nl.  It 
will also be published as an ISD Working Paper on the Indices of Social Development 
website: www.IndSocDev.org  
  
 5 
1. Introduction 
 
This report is the result of a study for the Dutch development NGO Hivos about the 
relationship between the production and use of independent media on the one hand and 
government accountability on the other hand. The background to this study is the 
question whether support for independent media contributes to more accountability of 
governments, and if so, through what mechanisms and how strong this relationship is. 
When the media is independently organized, does this put pressure on governments to 
deliver on democracy and health care for example? And, how does this happen? Does 
civil society make use of the media? How can we measure that? And how does the 
combination of free press and civic use of it lead to pressure on government? Through 
its social expenditures? A better rule of law? More effectiveness in policy making?  
 
These are typical questions that cannot be answered at the individual country level, 
because there are so many factors at play in this relationship. First, how would 
independent media affect accountability - what are the channels? Second, are these 
channels one-way or are there feedback-effects, from more accountability to more, or 
perhaps less, independent media? Think about Italy under the presidency of Silvio 
Berlusconi, who largely monopolised newspapers, radio and TV stations, and at the same 
time followed populist policies of quick service delivery when this contributed to more 
political support. Or think about Venezuela under Hugo Chavez, whose populist 
government used oil revenue to address short-term demands from the poor, without 
necessarily addressing underlying structural issues in an effective way. Third, if we know 
the main channels: what is the effect relative to other variables, which matter too? Such 
as level of economic development of a country or the extent of social spending? Here, 
China serves as an example. Despite limited democracy and constraints on civic activism, 
the country is relatively successful in service delivery for the poor, largely due to high 
economic growth. 
 
 
1.1 Quantitative versus qualitative analysis 
 
Qualitative research, at the level of a country, or even a smaller unit of analysis, such as a 
media independence support project, cannot distinguish between all these effects. For 
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example, it cannot exclude the level of economic development from the analysis and it 
cannot abstract from the existing rule of law, whether weak or strong. So, highly 
independent media may be observed with high levels of democracy or health outcomes, 
but isn't this sometimes more due to a country's relatively high level of GDP per capita 
as compared to its neighbouring countries? Or because of a stronger rule of law? Or 
higher health care expenditures by the government despite a lack of press freedom? 
Qualitative studies generally cannot answer these questions of influencing factors, and 
therefore can only answer the issue of causality in a limited, localized way. 
 
Comparative case studies can address these problems to some extent. For example by 
comparing three or four countries with low levels of economic development with three 
or four countries with high levels of economic development. But the sample size will be 
too small to be able to draw any generalizable conclusions on the effect of independent 
media on government accountability.  
 
The advantage of using a quantitative approach instead is that the analysis can distinguish 
between the role of independent media, its use by civil society, and its direct and indirect 
correlations with government accountability. Plus econometric tools to help address the 
direction of causality. The advantage of testing a relationship quantitatively at the cross-
country level is that this reveals statistical relationships due to the large number of 
countries involved. These can be tested in terms of signs (positive or negative 
relationship?), size (how strong is the relationship?) and statistical significance (what is 
the probability of a parameter to be true?). Moreover, it can control for the role of other 
factors such as economic growth, the relative size of social expenditures, and the rule of 
law. Finally, some econometric tools can be used to help assess causality, going beyond 
correlations. These tools help, although never perfectly, to assess the direction of 
causality: from independent media and its use to government accountability? Or the 
other way around? Hence, the findings will be generalizable for the country group and 
time-period involved. In our case these are almost all developing countries over the 
period 1990-2010. 
 
But quantitative analysis has its own weaknesses. These vary from problems of 
measurement at the cross-country level and data limitations, to the fact that causality can 
never be established with full certainty. Moreover, not everything that matters can be 
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measured. Hence, this study should be considered not as a stand-alone result, but should 
be interpreted alongside other analyses of media independence and government 
accountability, both qualitative and quantitative. 
 
 
1.2 Indices of Social Development 
 
ISS has a unique database, Indices of Social Development 1 . The ISD database is 
explained in a recent article by Foa et. al (2013). The database contains six indices, 
including one on the use that civic actors make of the media: Civic Activism Index (CA). 
This index was used in an earlier study by ISS on government accountability for the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IOB department, on the effects of development aid 
on civil society and government accountability in terms of poverty reduction, human 
rights and democracy (van Staveren and Webbink, 2012). This study for Hivos can be 
considered as a follow-up of that study. 
 
Next to ISD data, the study will make use of three other databases: for development 
indicators, governance indicators, and press freedom. 
 
The question, which this study addresses, is the following: what is the relationship 
between the production and use of independent media on the one hand and government 
social accountability on the other hand, for developing countries? 
 
 
2. Independent media and government accountability: a literature 
review 
 
This literature review will briefly discuss three related strands of literature: 
 Press freedom and independent media 
 Civic activism and the media 
 Government accountability 
 
                                                        
1 www.IndSocDev.org 
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2.1 Press freedom and independent media 
 
The media are an important means for democratic control and for civic activism to hold 
governments accountable for service delivery. But it does not always seem to perform 
this role due to a variety of limitations (Myers, 2012). With less censorship, less economic 
interests in the media by the ruling powers, and more legal protection of free press, the 
media is more likely to be able to perform its informative and questioning roles in 
society. So, what matters is media independence: legally, politically, and economically. 
Independent media concerns the production of information, and is therefore at the 
beginning of the chain of effects of government accountability. 
 
Empirical research into independent media uses either the Press Freedom Index put 
together by Freedom House, or the Press Freedom Index developed by journalists 
themselves through Reporters without Borders. A more recent index is the Media 
Sustainability Index by IREX. The IREX started in 2000 covering only European 
countries. It extended its measurement to the Middle East and North Africa in 2005 and 
to Africa in 2007, and covers 80 countries today. But not in Asia and Latin America. The 
Media Sustainability Index measures, like the two press freedom indices, media 
independence. But it covers it slightly more broadly2. It includes an indicator on whether 
the public media reflects the views across the political spectrum, are nonpartisan, and 
serve the public interest; and an indicator on whether a broad spectrum of social interests 
are reflected and represented in the media, including minority-language information 
sources. But the large majority of indicators overlap with or are identical to those in the 
two press freedom indices. And none of the three independent media indicators includes 
investigative journalism or other indicators of the depth of independent media. 
 
Two studies, which have compared the two press freedom indices, contradict each other 
in their findings about their similarity. They both compared the indices indirectly, by 
comparing their explanatory power in regression analyses with democracy and related 
variables. Norris (2006) concludes that they work out quite similarly in econometric 
analyses, whereas Tran et al (2011) find the results in regression analyses to be very 
different. But a recent and more thorough and direct analysis of the two measures of 
press freedom confirms Norris: the two measures are found to be quite similar, over time 
                                                        
2 http://www.irex.org/resource/media-sustainability-index-msi-methodology 
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and even across differences in country choices. Using correlation coefficients on each of 
the indicators making up each press freedom index, Becker and Vlad (2011, p. 38) 
conclude that: "The Freedom House measure and the Reporters without Borders 
measure are highly correlated. At present there is little to distinguish them." The average 
correlation (measured as r) between the two for the period 2002-2008 is 0.83. Hence, 70 
per cent (measured as r2) of the variation in the one can be explained by the other. This 
is, statistically seen, quite high. 
 
For the present study, the measure by IREX would have a slight preference over the 
other two measures on substantive grounds, because it is a little bit broader than the 
other two, although this difference is very small (see also Becker and Vlad, 2011). But its 
country coverage is very narrow (Europe, Middle East and Africa) and it covers only a 
few recent years for these countries. Hence, it cannot be used for a cross-country analysis 
for Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Press Freedom Index by Reporters without 
Borders is not much different from the one produced by Freedom House, while it covers 
slightly less countries and significantly less years. Hence, the present study opts for the 
Freedom House variable because it is available for more countries and years and anyway 
quite similar to the one produced by Reporters without Borders. 
 
Empirical research using the Freedom House Press Freedom Index (PF) has 
demonstrated the importance of the free press for government accountability. In 
particular, studies by Pippa Norris (2006; 2010) have shown the importance of this 
production dimension of independent media. In her 2006 study, she distinguished 
between three roles of the media: watch-dog, civic forum, and agenda-setter. 
Interestingly, these roles are very similar to the roles recognized in the literature on civil 
society, as the key roles that civic activism plays in holding governments accountable. 
This suggests that civic activism and press freedom are complementary, and mutually 
related: they feed into each other. In her 2010 edited volume, Norris, together with 
Odugbemi, has made a slight change in this threefold: now the media is seen as 
watchdog, agenda setter and gatekeeper. The gate keeper role is defined as guarding 
pluralism in the polity and society: “the news media should ideally serve as the classical 
agora by bringing together a plurality of diverse interests, voices, and viewpoints to 
debate issues of public concern” (Odugbemi and Norris, 2010: 390). In fact, the 
description of gatekeeper as creating an agora seems very close to what four years earlier 
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was named civic forum. 
 
The results of the empirical analysis in Norris (2006) show that press freedom is 
positively associated with greater political stability, rule of law, government efficiency in 
the policy process, regulatory quality, and low corruption. However, the study did not 
analyze the impact of press freedom on service delivery. Moreover, the regressions were 
only cross-country (hence, for a single year), without time-lags, and do not use controls 
for formal institutions and social expenditures. This leads to problems of endogeneity 
(reverse causality) and over-estimation of effects. For example, when the level of GDP 
per capita is ignored, regression results tend to over-estimate the effect of the 
explanatory variable, as if economic development does not matter. But we know from 
the literature that GDP does matter: more highly developed countries tend to have more 
press freedom. So, part of the effect measured by Norris may well be due to economic 
development rather than to press freedom alone. 
  
Norris (2006) also finds a positive association with democracy. But in the volume she 
edited on press freedom, Sheila Coronal (2010) notes that even in democracies the 
watchdog function of the media is repressed by governments, and journalist are killed: 
She remarks that in democracies like the Philippines, Mexico and Colombia, “journalist 
casualty rates are among the highest in the world” (p. 117). Moreover, she notes that “the 
impact of watchdog journalism is often diminished by the inertia of governments, the 
unwillingness of elites to take actions, the weight of bureaucratic cultures that are 
resistant to change, a law-enforcement system, that is incapable of punishing 
wrongdoing, and an apathetic and cynical public” (p. 128). 
 
Tran et al. (2011) found a positive association between the Freedom House Press 
Freedom Index and human development, measured with the Human Development 
Index of the UNDP. The sample size, however, is small, with only 65 countries in a 
hierarchical regression analysis. Interestingly, they found endogeneity effects: press 
freedom seems to both influence human development and is in turn influenced by 
human development. 
 
Becker and Vlad (2011) summarize in a detailed overview of the effects of independent 
media on development the empirical literature and conclude that press freedom 
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correlates negatively with corruption, as expected, and positively with various 
development outcomes. 
 
2.2 Civic activism and the media 
 
Studies on independent media recognize that an independent production of media is not 
in itself a sufficient indicator of information use. For example, Price (2011, p. 12) states, 
that "even a media system that is diverse and pluralistic may not achieve the goals of 
'voice'". Price also recognizes that none of the three measures of independent media 
referred to above addresses 'voice'. They measure the production of information, not how 
civil society makes use of it. And as Norris made clear, one of the three roles of 
independent media is the creation of a civic forum - this is precisely the space, which civil 
society is likely to fill. 
 
For this reason, we will add a measure of voice to the measure of press freedom. In this 
way, we will have complementary measures for independent media, namely (1) for the 
production of independent media and (2) for the use that civil society makes of the media 
that is available to them.  
 
The civic voice dimension of independent media concerns the monitoring and agenda 
setting roles of civil society vis-à-vis government. These roles of civil society have been 
referred to by Glasius (2010) as a mix of social capital, citizens active in public affairs, 
non-violent action, fostering public debate and counter hegemony. Fowler and Biekart 
(2008) therefore refer to these roles as the dynamic and agency dimensions of civil 
society, labeled as civic-driven change. Civic-driven change is in their view a combination 
of three dimensions: civic agency, collective action, and empowerment. This change, or 
at least this demand for change, by civil society, is the complement of the representative 
democratic checks and balances of governments. Together, they press for government 
accountability. But where the polity is weak or divided, politics corrupted, or democracy 
absent, civic activism becomes more important in holding governments accountable. So, 
we need to make a crucial distinction in government accountability: between political 
accountability, through the polity and its formal channels of representation on the one 
hand, and social accountability, through civil society and its informal channels of 
participation and voice. More on this below, in the section on government accountability. 
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Now, we focus on the role of civil society as active user of the media. How well does 
civil society play its function of civic-driven change? 
 
The empirical literature is rather silent on the effectiveness of civic activism in holding 
governments accountable. An empirical study by Williamson (2009) has assessed the 
relative effectiveness of the informal institutions of civil society (pro-social norms, trust, 
cooperation, demonstration, etc.) vis-à-vis the formal institutions of the state, such as the 
rule of law. She finds that “countries that have stronger informal institutions, regardless 
of the strength of formal institutions, achieve higher levels of economic development 
than those countries with lower informal institutional scores” (Williamson 2009: 377). A 
recent UNDP report on inequality notes about the role of civil society, that “coordinated 
mobilization is indispensable for people who wish to pursue a common interest and (…) 
claim specific policies” (UNDP, 2013: 263). These findings suggest that civic activism 
can positively contribute to the social accountability of government. 
 
A recent OECD overview study of social capital distinguishes four channels through 
which civic activism impacts upon wellbeing, through: (1) fostering trust and cooperative 
norms, (2) improving the performance of formal institutions, (3) having a direct impact 
on individual well-being, and (4) building networks and civic skills (Scrivens and Smith, 
2013). Of these four, channels two and three are the two, which are most likely to 
represent social accountability. In other words, these two channels are most likely to 
contribute to adequate service delivery by governments.  
 
The empirical quantitative literature connecting civil society directly to social 
accountability is very thin due to a lack of adequate data for voice. The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators include an index called Voice and Accountability. This index, 
however, focuses more on political accountability than on social accountability and it 
includes press freedom3. And it is constructed on the basis of expert opinions only: it 
lacks objective measures and attitudinal measures of the population. According to the 
Worldwide Governance Indicator explanation of Voice and Accountability (VA), it 
"captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and 
a free media." As a consequence, this measure is not an adequate complementary 
                                                        
3 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/va.pdf 
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measure to press freedom: it already includes press freedom (both the Freedom House 
index and the Reporters without Borders index). And its focus on political accountability, 
with perceptions about the functioning of institutions of the state, makes it inadequate to 
measure voice for social accountability purposes. 
 
The ISD Civic Activism Index (CA) makes it possible to measure how civil society 
makes use of the media. It does not measure NGO density in a country and NGO 
activity, which is done with a different measure in the ISD set, namely Clubs and 
Associations. CA measures the pressure, which civil society puts on the government, 
businesses, and dominant institutions, such as religion. It measures the use that people in 
general and civic agents in particular make of the media. 
 
The Civic Activism Index was used in a recent ISS study for the evaluation unit of the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IOB) on the role of civil society in development (van 
Staveren and Webbink, 2012). The analysis covered both political accountability 
(democracy and human rights) and social accountability (poverty reduction), and 
included several control variables and used data for many developing countries for a 
twenty-year period in a panel analysis. The study found that an increase in civic activism 
of 10% is associated with a statistically significant 4% poverty reduction (van Staveren 
and Webbink, 2012). This suggests a considerable positive impact of the use of 
independent media on holding the government accountable for service delivery. 
 
The regressions of civic activism on democracy and human rights showed no statistically 
significant associations. Hence, it seems that the use that people make of the media does 
not affect political accountability. Probably there are other factors that are more relevant 
for political accountability, in particular formal institutions of the state and the use that 
parliamentarians make of the media. In the IOB study, the most relevant factors that 
were found to matter for political accountability were indeed rule of law and also 
education.  
 
The strong and statistically significant association of civic activism with poverty 
reduction in the IOB study indicates that the use that civil society makes of the media 
does have an effect on development outcomes. In this study, we will use more detailed 
measures for development outcomes, going beyond the simple poverty head-count 
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indicator of 1.25 dollar-a-day. We expect that our choice of two key development 
outcome areas, health and education, will also have positive associations with civic 
activism as well as with press freedom. 
 
 
2.3 Government accountability 
 
Government accountability is a broad notion. It sometimes even includes good 
governance, on the how of governance, rather than on what it delivers. In this study we 
focus on social accountability, by elaborating service delivery. Next to this, we will also 
analyze political accountability, measured as the extent of democracy. Whereas in the 
IOB study, we only used Civic Activism as the explanatory variable (showing no 
statistically significant effect), here we will also use Press Freedom as explanatory variable 
for political democracy. 
 
Social accountability is concerned with the extent to which governments deliver what 
people demand (and pay for with their taxes), in particular on universal public goods 
such as health care and education. We use the definition of service-delivery focused 
government accountability in line with Khemani (2005: 186), who gives three criteria. A 
public agency is accountable for service delivery if it (1) assumes and is assigned 
responsibility, (2) has some minimum resources and capacity, and (3) undertakes 
appropriate actions towards service delivery, given resource and capacity constraints. For 
this understanding of government accountability, Shah (2008) has argued that citizen-
centric governance is the most effective approach to enforce service delivery. This 
government accountability model for service delivery implies, according to Shah, 
responsiveness, fairness, responsibility, and judicial accountability. This would result, 
among others, in public services consistent with citizen preferences, improvements in 
economic and social outcomes and quality of life, improvements in quantity, quality and 
access of public services, including for the poor, minorities and disadvantaged groups, 
and better and cheaper services. 
 
A literature review by IDS on accountability and service delivery makes also a distinction 
between social and political accountability. It recognizes that social accountability of 
government is through “a continuous relationship of citizen’s demands through street 
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protests and mobilizations, public naming and shaming, signing of petitions, etc.” (Mejis 
Acosta, 2010: 13) Social accountability is particularly focused on service delivery, 
according to IDS: “The core feature of social accountability mechanisms is to exert 
direct political influence on government officials to extract increased – and effective – 
government action in the short run. Through social accountability mechanisms, citizens 
have organized to demand service provision from government officials in charge of 
specific sectors (health, water, sanitation), sometimes even bypassing some elected bodies 
(national legislatures, city councils)” (idem).  
 
The IDS desk review of sixteen case studies is qualitative but interestingly, it uses rather 
similar criteria for social accountability as the quantitative analysis of this study, namely: 
 Demand for social accountability (production and use of independent media) 
 Responsiveness in service delivery (social expenditures) 
 Standards for service delivery (health and educational outcomes) 
 Enforceability (rule of law, government effectiveness) 
 
On the basis of the qualitative desk review, the IDS report suggests “a positive 
association between effective accountability and the adequate provision of government 
service.” (idem: 28) But the report admits that it cannot say anything about causality. 
This is precisely what our quantitative study, with its control variables and endogeneity 
checks, will address, to the extent possible. 
 
Relying on the conceptualizations by Khemani and Shah, we focus government 
accountability on service delivery, and in particular of basic social services, namely health 
care and education, and measure this with outcome indicators. Not input indicators (such 
as budget) or output indicators (such as number of patients treated) but indicators, which 
reflect the extent to which services do what citizens’ expect from them. In particular, 
improved outcomes and quality of life, and access and better services for socially 
excluded or disadvantaged groups. Of course, as Khemani states, this should take into 
account the limitations of resources and capacities. That is why in our empirical analysis, 
we use control variables for these two constraints: the level of economic development of 
a country, measured as GDP per capita (resource constraint), and the share of social 
expenditures out of GDP (capacity constraint). 
 
 16 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
 No studies have used variables for both the production of independent media 
and the use that civil society makes of it. They have used only press freedom or 
only civic activism. Hence, they have either measured the production of 
independent media without also measuring the use of it, or they have measured 
the use that civil society makes of the media, without measuring the extent of 
independent production of the media. 
 
 Press freedom and civic activism have each independently shown to be positively 
correlated with government accountability. But there exists no study, which 
systematically distinguishes between political and social accountability and 
between the indirect effect on accountability mechanisms (such as corruption or 
social expenditures of the government) and the direct effect on accountability 
delivery (such as improved health care outcomes). 
 
The value added of this study is that it will address both gaps in the literature. It will 
measure the production and the use of independent media, and it will measure the effect 
on the mechanisms of social accountability and the effect on social accountability delivery 
and on political accountability delivery. Moreover, it will use more advanced econometric 
techniques in order to help assessing causality. 
 
3. Data and methods 
 
The sample that we have selected consists of all low income and medium income 
countries in the period 1990-2010. Depending on which variables are used in the various 
regression analyses, there will be more or less missing data. The time period is divided in 
5-year periods, with data for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. 
 
In order to explain variation between countries and years in government social 
accountability delivery, we have taken a two-step approach. First, we analyse the indirect 
effect of the production and use of independent media on intermediary variables. 
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Second, we analyse the direct effect of the production and use of independent media on 
service delivery. In this way, we establish two sets of effects of independent media: the 
indirect effect on social accountability mechanisms, and the direct effect on social 
accountability delivery, plus a direct effect on political accountability. 
 
 
3.1 Production and use of independent media variables 
 
The Press Freedom Index (PF) developed by Freedom House that we use measures 
media independence of print, broadcast, and internet media. It consists of 109 indicators 
in three areas4: legal environment (laws, regulations, guarantees, and independence of the 
judiciary bodies), political environment (political control such as censorship, news 
diversity, intimidation and violence against journalists), and economic environment 
(transparency and concentration of ownership of media sources, selective withholding of 
advertising or subsidies, and bribery). 
 
As argued in section 2, this measure is very similar to those produced by Reporters 
without Borders and by IREX. None of these three includes indicators of investigative 
journalism or other measures of the depth of journalistic contents (only to a very small 
extent by IREX). The Freedom House measure is therefore chosen because it includes 
data for much more countries and much more years. 
 
The Civic Activism Index (CA) measures citizen's use of the media (listening to radio 
and TV news, reading newspapers and using internet to learn about political 
developments) and support for and participation in civic activities such as in 
demonstrations and petitions, as well as the strength of civil society (based on Civicus 
ratings)5. Civic activism refers to the social norms, organisations, and practices, which 
facilitate greater citizen involvement in public policies and decisions. The ISD measure 
of the strength of civic activism uses 33 indicators on the extent of engagement in civic 
activities such as signing petitions or joining peaceful demonstrations, studies of the 
organisation and effectiveness of civil society, access to sources of media information, 
levels of civic awareness and information on political matters and concerns, and the 
                                                        
4 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2012/methodology#.U4MMHy80zeY 
5 http://www.indsocdev.org/civic-activism.html 
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extent to which civil society organisations are connected to broader, international 
networks of civic activity.  
 
We have also used the variable Voice and Accountability Index (VA), although our 
assessment of the underlying indicators has shown that it is not a very suitable variable 
for the research question at hand. Because it includes press freedom and it focuses on 
political accountability. We only include it to show how it functions in the regressions, as 
compared to the Civic Activism Index. For an explanation of the Voice and 
Accountability Index, see section 2 above. 
 
 
3.2 Indirect effects: social accountability mechanisms 
 
First, we analyse the relationship between the independent media variables on the one 
hand and social accountability mechanisms on the other hand. So, we study how the 
production and use of independent media affect mechanisms of social accountability. 
The social accountability mechanisms include the rule of law, social expenditures, and 
government effectiveness. The literature refers to all these variables, even though they 
have often not been tested.  
 
With an adequate rule of law in place, a country is more likely to be able to deliver 
services effectively. Rule of Law "captures perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence" 6 . It is a comprehensive index of formal institutions representing the 
effectiveness of government to protect citizen's rights. The Rule of Law index (RL) is 
part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank. 
 
The higher the share of government expenditures on health care or education, the more 
resources available for social service delivery. We therefore use the share of GDP spent 
by government on health care and on education. Together, we sometimes refer to these 
variables as the social expenditure variables. The data for Expenditures on Health 
(EXPH) and Expenditures on Education (EXPE) are provided by World Bank's World 
                                                        
6 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
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Development Indicators7. 
 
Government Effectiveness is an intermediary variable, which makes part of the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, just like Rule of Law and Voice and Accountability. 
According to the database, the Government Effectiveness Index (GE) "captures 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies"8. 
Its indicators are all subjective measures (perceptions) and often refer to the government 
as bureaucracy and the extent to which it hinders the freedom of business operations. 
They also include perceptions about the coverage of public services, a set of output 
variables, not outcome or impact variables, of service delivery. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Control variables 
 
Control variables are expected, on the basis of the literature, to also have an influence on 
the outcome variables of health and education. The most important one is the level of 
economic development of a country, measured as GDP per capita (GDP). The richer a 
country, the more likely it is that the government will have the capacity for adequate 
service delivery. The intermediary variables discussed above function as control variables 
in the second part of the analysis, in which all variables are included: direct and indirect 
effects on service delivery. 
 
 
3.4 Social accountability delivery variables and political accountability 
variable 
 
The government social accountability data are the outcome measures of public service 
                                                        
7 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
8 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc 
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delivery. They measure the extent to which people's wellbeing has improved. We have 
selected two areas of wellbeing: health and education, with four variables in each area. 
The health outcome variables that we use are: infant mortality, under five mortality, 
immunization DPT and immunization measles. The educational outcome variables that 
we use are: pupil/teacher ratio primary education, pupil/teacher ratio secondary 
education, primary completion rate, and primary gross enrolment rate. The data are all 
from the World Development Indicators. 
 
For political accountability, we use, as in the IOB study, the extent of democracy as the 
outcome variable. We follow the literature by using the Polity IV measure of democracy 
for this.9 This is a measure of institutionalized democracy consisting of three dimensions: 
institutions and processed for elections, institutionalized constraints on executive power, 
and guarantee of civil liberties to all. It measures these three dimensions through eleven 
indicators, which together result in a score between -0.1 and + 0.1. This is a twenty-one 
point scale. 
 
 
 
3.5 Three equations 
 
The research question, the literature review, and our selection of variables lead to the 
following three equations that we estimate with panel regression analysis: 
 
(1) SAM = x1PF + x2CA + x3VA + x4C* 
(2) SAD = y1PF + y2CA + y3GDP + y4EXP + y5RL + y6GE + y7C* 
(3) PAD = z1PF + z2CA + z3GDP + z4RL + z5GE + z6C* 
 
SAM = Social Accountability Mechanisms = four intermediary variables: EXPH, EXPE, 
RL, and GE. 
 
SAD = Social Accountability Delivery = four health outcome indicators and four 
education outcome indicators: IMR, U5MR, ID, IM, PCR, PTP, PTS, PGER 
                                                        
9 http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
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PAD = Political Accountability Delivery = one outcome indicator, namely democracy: 
DEM 
 
PF = Press Freedom 
CA = Civic Activism 
VA = Voice and Accountability 
GDP = logarithm of Gross Domestic Product per capita 
EXP = EXPH or EXPE = share of public health or education expenditures out of GDP 
RL = Rule of Law Index 
GE = Government Effectiveness 
IMR = Infant Mortality Rate 
U5MR = Under-5 Mortality Rate 
ID = Immunization Rate DTP 
IM = Immunization Rate Measles 
PCR = Primary Completion Rate 
PTP = Pupil-Teacher ratio Primary 
PTS = Pupil-Teacher ratio Secondary 
PGER = Primary Gross Enrolment Rate 
DEM = Democracy 
C* = constant term 
 
Finally, x, y, and z are parameters, which we will estimate. They measure the size and sign 
(positive or negative) for each variable association. 
 
 
3.6 Data sources and scales 
 
The sources of the data are all online and can be found at: World Bank's World 
Development Indicators (GDP, EXP, and eight SAD variables), Indices of Social 
Development (CA), Freedom House (PF), the World Bank's Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (RL, VA, GE), and the Polity IV project (DEM). 
 
The original data for all the variables have different scales. We have transformed almost 
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all scales into index numbers between 0,00 and 1,00. This means, that the interpretation 
of the parameters is in terms of percentage points change: the scale is similar to that of 
percentages. For example, we may see that 10 percentage points increase in press 
freedom is associated with 4 percentage point increase in social expenditures. This would 
mean that, for example, for Bolivia, an increase in the press freedom score from 0,43 to 
0,53 (a 10 percentage point increase) is associated with an increase in the social 
expenditures from 0,16 to 0,20 (a 4 percentage point increase), that is, from 16% of 
GDP to 20% of GDP. 
 
This measure is not the case for the GDP variable, which is measured on a logarithmic 
scale. In our dataset, this runs from about 4 to about 10. But the interpretation of change 
along a logarithmic scale is as a percentage. So, for example, for Bolivia a 1% increase in 
GDP per capita may be associated with a 3% increase in the immunization rate. Also the 
two child mortality rates are not in percentages. They are measured as absolute deaths 
per 1000 live born. Finally, democracy is measured on a twenty-one point scale, between 
-0.1 and +0.1. 
 
We describe the measurement of each variable in detail. The Press Freedom Index is 
measured negatively. PF of 0 means full press freedom and 1 means no press freedom at 
all. The other variables are measured positively. So, for example, a Civic Activism score 
of 0 means no civic activism and 1 a very high level of civic activism. Similarly for Voice 
and Accountability. 
 
GDP per capita is measured in dollars, and varies from a few hundred per year to several 
thousand dollars per year. In line with econometric practice, we have normalized the 
income data by taking the logarithm: lnGDP pc. The share of health expenditures and 
education expenditures are percentages of GDP. Rule of Law (RL) is measured in rank 
percentiles between 0 and 1, with 1 the highest level of rule of law. GE is measured 
between 0 and with 1 being the highest score. 
 
Infant mortality rate (IMR) is measured as deaths of children under one year per 1,000 
live births, and then turned into ratios between 0 and 1. Under five mortality (U5MR) is 
similarly measured as deaths of children under five year per 1,000 live births. The two 
immunization rates (ID and IM) are percentages of children between 12 and 23 months 
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old. The pupil/teacher variables (PTP and PTS) are measured as the ratio of pupils per 
teacher. The primary school completion rate (PCR) is measured as the percentage of 
children of the relevant age group who have completed primary school. The primary 
gross enrolment rate (PGER) is measured as the percentage of children in the relevant 
age group enrolled in primary school. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
All data is summarized in table 1. The columns show the number of observations, the 
mean of each value, standard deviation, and the minimum and maximum values for each 
variable. 
 
 
3.7 Methods 
 
The methods used are described below for the two steps of the analysis. But before that, 
we did a causality check between press freedom and civic activism. We tested the 
assumption that the two selected measures for independent media are complementary 
rather than substitutes. We tested this in two ways. We did a bivariate regression analysis 
between the variables PF and CA, with a constant. The next step was a causality test, to 
find out whether it is likely that a change in one of these variables may be related to a 
change in the other one in the previous period. We used a Granger causality test, which 
looks for an association in changes of two variables over time: do changes in the one 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Civic Activism Index (CA) 606  0,46 0,07 0,13 0,77 
Government Effectiveness (GE) 518  0,35 0,21 0,00 0,84 
Press Freedom Index (PF) 631  0,55 0,23 0,08 1,00 
Rule of Law Index (RL) 533  0,35 0,21 0,00 0,86 
Voice and Accountability Index (VA) 533  0,37 0,23 0,00 0,90 
Log of GDP pc (GDP) 638  7,05 1,11 4,17 9,67 
Public Spending in Education (EXPE) 375  0,04 0,02 0,01 0,15 
Health Expenditure (EXPH) 516  0,03 0,02 0,00 0,19 
Infant Mortality Rate 665  50.95 33.62 4.7 165.2 
Under-5 Mortality Rate 665  74.49 58.75 6 326.1 
Immunization DPT 654  0,79 0,20 0,00 0,99 
Immunization Measles 643  0,78 0,20 0,00 0,99 
Pupil-teacher Ratio, primary 514  0,32 0,14 0,08 0,90 
Pupil-teacher Ratio, secondary 291  0,21 0,08 0,07 0,54 
School Enrolment, primary 527  0,98 0,22 0,21 1,61 
Primary Completion Rate 438  0,55 0,15 0,20 0,83 
Democracy 569 0,01 0,06 -0.1 0.10 
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variable precede changes in the other variable? This is a time-consistent causality test. 
 
Next, we did multivariate panel regression analysis to address our research question, 
using the two equations formulated above. Multivariate means that we included all 
relevant variables at the same time. Panel analysis means that we combined both 
countries and years together in a single, combined data set. In other words, we combine 
cross-country data with time-series data for the five available years. The reason for doing 
so is that a panel increases the number of observations, which leads to more reliable 
results. For example, we include for Bolivia five data points: Bolivia 1990, Bolivia 1995, 
Bolivia 2000, Bolivia 2005, and Bolivia 2010. If for a country data is missing for two 
years, the panel data still includes the country for the remaining three years of data.  
Moreover, panel estimations allow for two types of controls for endogeneity, the 
statistical term for reverse causality. Of course, we do not want that our results can 
equally be interpreted as governance accountability explaining independent media. 
 
The two ways in which we have controlled for endogeneity are as follows. First, we have 
used country fixed effects estimations. This means that we control for time-independent 
effects per country. We are not interested in differences between countries as such but in 
the variation across the whole dataset, of country-year combinations. Second, we have 
done the same regression analysis with a one period time-lag for the explanatory 
variables, PF and CA. This means that we have used PF and CA data of the previous 
five-year period to explain the variation in the service delivery outcome variables. If the 
results are similar to those of the regressions without time-lags, it is likely that the 
direction of causality is from the production and use of independent media to 
government accountability and not the other way around, because of the time-
consistency built-in in a time-lag estimation. 
 
Finally, we like to draw the attention to the weaknesses of our analysis. First, the service 
delivery variables, as outcome variables, not only refer to government efforts but also 
include efforts of the private sector and communities to deliver better health and 
educational outcomes. Second, for various variables, there is missing data for individual 
country-year combinations. We have been able to address this partially by using data for 
the years close to the selected years. This is justifiable, because also the CA index is 
constructed with data for the two years below and above the selected year. For example, 
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where data was missing for a variable for 2005, but available for one of the years 2003, 
3004, 2006, or 2007, we included the observations for the closest available year of these 
four alternative years for the 2005 data. Third, although we did causality checks between 
PF and CA and for PF and CA vis-a-vis the service delivery variables, the results can 
never provide a hundred per cent reliability of the direction of causality. But, compared 
to the empirical literature discussed above, our estimations address the endogeneity issue 
more extensively, in three complementary ways. We did this through a Granger-causality 
test for the independent media variables, we used a fixed effects estimation, and we did a 
robustness check with time-lagged variables for independent media. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 The relationship between the production and use of independent media 
 
The result of the bi-variate regression analysis between press freedom (PF) and civic 
activism (CA) shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between the two 
variables, in neither direction. This result is sufficient to support our assumption, that 
press freedom and civic activism are complementary variables, rather than causally 
related or substitutes. The simple correlation between the two variables is quite small (-
0.32): they clearly measure different things. The sign is negative, because, remember, 
press freedom is measured negatively: the higher the score, the less press freedom in a 
country. So, together they seem an adequate and relatively complete measure for the 
production and use of independent media. 
 
Although not necessary anymore, we did an additional causality test, using the Granger 
causality test. Here we found that CA seems to weakly causally influence PF, in a 
statistically significant way, but not the other way around. Perhaps that a more active civil 
society more strongly demands press freedom as compared to a more passive civil 
society. But we should not rely too much on this result, because the effect is small and 
the bi-variate regression analysis showed that the relationship between the two variables 
is not only weak but also statistically insignificant. 
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Our conclusion from this preliminary step in the quantitative analysis is that our 
assumption that press freedom and civic activism are complementary measures of 
independent media is not contradicted by the statistical results. We have therefore used 
in the rest of the study not just one of these variables but both PF and CA as explanatory 
variables, next to each other: PF as an index for the production of independent media 
and CA as an index for the use of independent media. 
 
We also checked for the correlations between Voice and Accountability on the one hand 
and our two independent media variables. As expected, the correlation is relatively high 
between VA and PF (-0.62), because PF is included in VA. And it is quite low between 
VA and CA (0.32). Moreover, the Granger Causality test has shown no causal 
relationship between VA on the one hand and PF and CA on the other hand. But since 
part of VA is a substitute for PF, we cannot use these variables together, because then 
we would estimate the same thing twice. We therefore have decided not to use VA 
anymore in the remainder of the analysis. 
 
 
4.2 Correlations: scatterplots 
 
Before going into the multivariate regressions, let us start with the more intuitive 
statistical relationships with the help of scatterplots. The diagrams below show every 
time the statistical relationship between two variables. We have only included those plots, 
which reveal clear patterns between variables. The first series of diagrams show 
correlations between the two independent media variables on the one hand and social 
accountability mechanisms on the other hand. The second series of diagrams shows 
correlations between the two independent media variables on the one hand and social 
accountability delivery on the other hand. 
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Series 1: Independent media and social accountability mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
Series 2: Independent media and social accountability delivery 
 
 
 
 
The scatter plots and the regression lines, expressing the best-fit relationship between the 
two variables, all show clear relationships in the expected direction. The higher the press 
freedom score (which means that there is very low press freedom), the lower health 
expenditures as share of GDP. The more civic activism, the stronger the rule of law by 
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government. The higher the press freedom score, the more kids finish primary school. 
And, finally, the more civic activism, the less children under five die. 
 
But bi-variate correlations are a very crude method to measure statistical relationships. 
Because they do not control for the influence of other variables, which may be equally 
important or even more influential. That is why we need to do multivariate regression 
analysis. This allows for estimating the simultaneous influence of all relevant factors. 
Which factors are most relevant? Which factors become irrelevant or even have a reverse 
influence when other factors are taken into account? And what is their probability of 
being estimated correctly (statistical significance)? 
 
 
4.3 Direct effects: independent media and social accountability mechanisms 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of the first equation: the effects of the 
production and use of independent media on social accountability mechanisms. The first 
column shows the two independent media variables PF (Press Freedom) and CA (Civic 
Activism), with in addition Voice and Accountability (VA), just for comparison. The 
fourth variable is a constant term. N refers to the sample size: the number of 
observations included in the estimation (which depends on data availability for each 
variable). Each model estimates the parameters of the relationships of independent 
media with a social accountability mechanism. The four mechanisms and their respective 
models are:  
 
(1) public expenditures on health care (EXPH) 
(2) public expenditures on education (EXPE) 
(3) rule of law (RL) 
(4) government effectiveness (GE) 
 
The four models show the parameter sizes, their sign (positive or negative), and the level 
of statistical significance (denoted by *) of the parameter estimations, for each social 
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accountability mechanism10. The absence of a * after a parameter value means that there 
is a probability larger than 10 per cent that the parameter value estimated is wrong. We 
will therefore ignore those results, and only explain the parameters that are statistically 
significant. 
 
All the models are quite weak, as shown by the low values of R square. These range from 
0.01 to 0.20, implying that the three explanatory variables together explain only 1% (in 
model 2) to 20% (in model 3) of the variation in the dependent variables. This is a 
limited model fit, and it implies that the social accountability mechanisms are only to a 
limited extent influenced by independent media. 
 
 
Table 2. Regression results of three independent media on social 
accountability mechanisms 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
EXPH EXPE RL GE 
PF -0.006 0.010 -0.056 -0.029 
CA 0.036*** 0.006 -0.173** -0.092 
VA 0.004 0.016 0.411*** 0.380*** 
C* 0.013 0.030** 0.298*** 0.273*** 
N 471 317 478 472 
R-sq 0.04 0.01 0.20 0.13 
Note: p-values in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
The statistically significant results of table 2 can be interpreted as follows. Civic Activism 
shows a positive correlation with health expenditures but a negative correlation with Rule 
of Law. The first is expected, the second not. Perhaps an active civil society may upset 
the rule of law? 
 
Voice and Accountability shows expected positive correlations with Rule of Law and 
Government Effectiveness. But, as indicated above, VA includes PF, which leads to 
double measurement. Table 3 shows the same results but now dropping VA. The results 
presented in table 3 show that without the overlapping variable of VA, the results for PF 
                                                        
10 The more *, the higher the statistical significance: *** means that the probability of being wrong is 
less than 1%; ** means that the probability of being wrong is less than 5%; * means that the 
probability of being wrong is less than 10%. 
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and CA are in general a bit stronger and more often statistically significant, but the model 
fit remains low (between 0% and 7%). 
 
 
Table 3. Regression results of two independent media on social accountability 
mechanisms 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
EXPH EXPE RL GE 
PF -0.008 0.004 -0.226*** -0.190*** 
CA 0.037*** 0.013 -0.145 -0.044 
C* 0.016*** 0.035*** 0.526*** 0.474*** 
N 471 353 478 472 
R-sq 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.04 
Note: p-values in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
 
The results of table 3 are as follows: 
 Press freedom (PF) is correlated with more rule of law (RL) and more 
government effectiveness (GE) 
 10 percentage point less PF is associated with 2 percentage point (0.023) 
reduction of RL 
 10 percentage point less PF is associated with 2 percentage point (0.019) 
reduction in GE 
 Civic activism (CA) is correlated with increased health expenditures 
 10 percentage point improvement in CA is associated with 0.4 percentage point 
(0.004) increase in health expenditures, for example, from 5,6% of GDP to 6,0% 
of GDP 
 
We did a causality test relying on time-consistency of variation. For this we use the time-
lagged values (one five-year period) for the explanatory variables (PF and CA). Table 4 
shows the results. The model fit, measured with R square, is more or less the same as 
before, between 1% and 8%. 
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Table 4. Time-lag estimations of social accountability mechanisms 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
EXPH EXPE RL GE 
PF -0.002 -0.006 -0.054* -0.058* 
CA 0.000*** 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
C* 0.011 0.039*** 0.430*** 0.463*** 
N 450 307 457 453 
R-sq 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Note: p-values in parentheses: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
When we compare the time-lagged estimations (table 4) with the non-time-lagged 
estimations (table 3), we see that in 7 out of 8 cases the sign of the parameter is the same. 
But we see lower parameter sizes and weaker statistical significance. CA of five years 
back has clearly no effect at all: its effects are probably more immediate, putting pressure 
on governments to act now. The time-lagged results suggests that there may not be a 
strong causality from the production and use of independent media variables to the 
social accountability mechanisms, in any case not of civic activism. This was, of course, 
already clear from the low model fit scores (measured as R-squared) in table 3.  
 
The overall conclusion from the estimations of the direct effects of the production and 
use of independent media is that these correlations and their likely causality are rather 
weak. But it is clear that press freedom and civic activism can be considered as 
complementary variables, measuring, respectively, the production of independent media 
and the use that civil society makes of it. The Worldwide Governance variable of voice 
and accountability has overlaps with press freedom and therefore shows artificially high 
results, which need to be dropped.  
 
 
4.4 Indirect effects (1): independent media and service delivery 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the estimations of the second equation: the results of the 
effects of independent media and other relevant factors on social accountability 
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delivery 11 . It estimates four models with health service delivery outcomes. The 
estimations include the two variables for independent media (PF and CA), the control 
variable for level of economic development (GDP), and three social accountability 
mechanisms (EXPH, RL, GE). The model fit is much better than was the case for the 
intermediary variables. R square ranges now from 23% to 55% explanation of the 
variation in the dependent variables. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Health service delivery outcomes of social accountability 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate (1000 
live births) 
Under-5 
Mortality 
Rate (1000 
live births) 
Immunization 
DPT 
Immunization 
Measles 
PF -11.03 -22.36 -0.042 -0.026 
CA -88.98*** -171.4*** 0.614*** 0.411*** 
GDP -12.28*** -171.4*** 0.067*** 0.080***   
RL -14.94* -30.05* -0.021 -0.031 
EXPH -203.3*** -400.7*** 1.300* 0.994 
GE 9.37 11.96 -0.017 0.058 
C* 190.1*** 305.2*** 0.042 0.019 
N 457 457 457 457 
R-sq 0.55 0.47 0.23 0.24 
Note: p-values in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
The results of table 5 can be interpreted as follows. First, we see that one of the two 
independent media variables, PF, has no statistically significant association at all with any 
of the four health service delivery outcomes (and unexpected signs). To the contrary, CA 
has strong correlations and the expected signs, with every health outcome variable: the 
parameter values are large and the statistical significance is high (***). This suggests that 
for health service delivery, not press freedom but civic activism is the key independent 
media variable. 
 
                                                        
11 Although our hypothesis did not include it, we also run regressions with an additional variable for 
governance, namely the ISD index for Interpersonal Safety and Trust. And we also used an additional 
control variable, namely the Gender Equality Index from ISD. We have not included these results, due 
to a lack of theoretical support. Both showed some statistically significant results, but with unexpected 
signs, which we cannot explain. 
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Second, we see that of the other variables, the control variables, GE has no statistically 
significant association in any model. Why not? There may be two reasons. A first reason 
may be, as we have seen in section 2, that government effectiveness is a rather neoliberal 
measure, focusing on bureaucracy, outputs rather than outcomes, and constraints for 
businesses. This is not very likely to help improve health care service delivery. A second 
reason may be that rule of law is a better indicator of the effectiveness of governments to 
ensure adequate service delivery. The results indeed indicate that RL is associated with 
less children dying, although not with immunization. 
 
Third, the results also show that money matters. The level of GDP per capita has the 
expected associations, which are statistically significant in all models, but stronger for 
child death rates than for immunizations. Richer countries have lower child mortality 
rates. The share of government expenditures on health care matters in three of the four 
models, with high parameter values for child mortality. So, more public spending on 
health care seems to improve health care outcomes.  
 
As before, we have tested for causality using fixed effects estimations and adding a time-
lag estimation. The result of the time-lag estimations can be found in the annex, table A1. 
Comparison with table 5 shows that the model fit is more or less the same and also that 
the parameter signs and values are quite similar. Hence, we have no indication of 
reversed causality. It is quite likely that causality runs from independent media, income 
and expenditures, and rule of law, to health care service delivery and not the other way 
around. 
 
This leads to the following table in which we summarize the statistically significant 
parameters as effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables. The 
numbers indicate the percentage point change in the health care delivery outcome (which 
ranges from 1 to 100 per cent), from a ten percentage point change in the associated 
independent variable. For GDP we use a 1% GDP per capita growth rate. The results 
will be explained below. 
 
 
 
 
 35 
Table 6. Summary results of a 0.10 increase in independent variables 
Model: 0.10 more 
CA 
1% more 
GDP 
0.10 more 
RL 
0.10 more 
EXPH 
(1) Infant mortality - 8.9 - 12.3 - 1.5 - 20.3 
(2) Under-5 mortality - 17.1 - 171 - 3.0 - 40.1 
(3) Immunization 
DTP 
+ 0.06 + 0.07  + 0.13 
(4) Immunization 
measles 
+ 0.04 + 0.08   
 
 
The summary results of table 6 indicate that the biggest effect on health outcomes comes 
from an increase in the health budget. The effect of economic growth is also large: the 
table shows the effect of a one per cent increase in GDP per capita, but annual per capita 
economic growth was around 3% for developing countries. Finally, the effect of civic 
activism is not small either in particular for the two child mortality outcomes (8.9 and 
17.1 lower child mortality). 
 
The last set of results from equation two concerns the service delivery outcome variables 
for education. Table 7 shows the regression results. The structure of the models is the 
same as in table 5, the health service delivery models. The R squared shows a varied 
model fit, from a moderate 18% to a high of 80% explanation of the variation in the 
dependent variables.  
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Table 7. Education service delivery outcomes of social accountability 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 
Primary 
Completion 
Rate 
Pupil-
teacher 
Ratio, 
primary 
Pupil-
teacher 
Ratio, 
secondary 
Primary 
Gross 
Enrolment 
Rate 
PF 0.049** 0.017 -0.023 -0.079 
CA 0.188*** 0.002 0.462*** 0.551** 
GDP 0.054*** -0.039*** -0.007 0.036** 
RL 0.029 0.037 0.052 -0.105 
EXPE 0.210 -0.129 0.385 2.523*** 
GE 0.009 0.124** 0.092* 0.210* 
_cons 0.032 0.530*** -0.026 0.390*** 
N 239 277 168 278 
R-sq 0.80 0.23 0.23 0.18 
Note: p-values in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
From table 7, we find the following results. First, we find that of the two independent 
media variables, again CA gives more statistically significant results than PF, which now 
has one result with statistical significance. But this result of PF has an unexpected sign: 
the primary completion rate increases with less press freedom. We cannot explain this 
result. CA is positively correlated with the primary completion rate, and almost four 
times stronger than PF. In addition, more CA is positively associated with a higher 
primary school enrolment rate. But the sign of the parameter of CA for pupil-teacher 
ratio in secondary education is unexpected. We have no explanation for this, except the 
possibility that classes may get fuller with more civic-driven change. More civic 
engagement may induce parents more to send their children to school, even without an 
expansion of school-capacity. 
 
Second, rule of law shows no statistically significant associations. But government 
effectiveness does. This is contrary to the results for the health models. Now, GE is 
positively associated with primary school enrolment, but has unexpected signs for the 
pupil-teacher ratio. Hence, the results for government effectiveness are mixed and 
cannot be explained easily. Again, this may have to do with its neoliberal measurement. 
 
Third, money matters not only for health outcomes but also for educational outcomes. 
The signs are all as expected. GDP maters in three of the four models, whereas 
 37 
educational expenditures matters in one model. 
 
As before, we have tested for causality using fixed effects estimations and adding a time-
lag estimation. The result of the time-lag estimations can be found in the annex, table A2. 
Comparison with table 7 shows that the model fit is more or less the same and also that 
the parameter signs and values are quite similar. Hence, we have no indication of 
reversed causality. It is quite likely that causality runs from independent media, income 
and expenditures, and government effectiveness, to education service delivery and not 
the other way around. 
 
This leads to Table 8 in which we summarize the statistically significant parameters as 
effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables. As before, the numbers 
indicate the percentage point change in the education delivery outcome (which ranges 
from 1 to 100 per cent), from a ten percentage point change in the associated 
independent variable. For GDP we use again a 1% GDP per capita growth rate. The 
results will be explained below. 
 
 
Table 8. Summary results of a 0.10 increase in independent variables 
Model: 0.10 more 
PF 
0.10 more 
CA 
1% more 
GDP 
0.10 more 
EXPE 
0.10 more 
GE 
(1) Primary 
Completion rate 
+ 0.01 + 0.02 + 0.05   
(2) Pupil-Teacher 
ratio Primary 
  - 0.04  0.01 
(3) Pupil-Teacher 
ratio Secondary 
 + 0.05   + 0.01 
(4) Primary Gross 
Enrolment Rate 
 + 0.06 + 0.04 + 0.25 + 0.02 
 
 
The summary table indicates that the biggest size impacts on educational outcomes are 
from money variables: public expenditures on health and economic growth. But they 
impact only on some education outcome variables, and not on others. The effect of 
government effectiveness is very small. Our variables of concern in this study, for 
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independent media also show relatively small effects, in particular for press freedom. 
Civic activism helps to modestly increase the primary completion rate (2 percentage 
points) and the primary enrolment rate (6 percentage points). But the sign for the pupil-
teacher ratio in secondary education is unexpected - we cannot explain this. 
 
 
 
4.5 Indirect effects (2): independent media and democracy 
 
The third equation estimates the effect of independent media on political accountability. 
It uses the extent of democracy as the measure of political accountability. Table 9 shows 
the results. The model fit is small to moderate, with an R squared of 0.15. The table gives 
in the first column the regular estimations and in the second column the time-lagged 
estimations for PF and CA of a 5-year period earlier. The signs remain the same between 
both models and the sizes of the variables are stronger in the second model, except for 
Government Effectiveness. 
 
 
 
Table 9. Democracy outcome of political accountability 
 
 
(1) (2) 
Variables Democracy 
Democracy 
time lags for 
PF and CA 
PF -0.089*** -0.049 
CA 0.047 0.187*** 
GDP 0.008** 0.016*** 
RL 0.068** 0.061 
GE -0.054** -0.029 
_cons -0.012 -0.017 
N 435 421 
R-sq 0.148 0.148 
Note: p-values in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
The interpretation of the results will focus on the first column of results, without time-
lags. They show an interesting contrast with the results for social accountability. Now, 
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for political accountability, not CA but PF is the statistically significant independent 
media variable. A ten percent improvement in press freedom correlates with a 
strengthening of democracy of 0.009 points on the democracy scale, which is an 
improvement in the democracy score of 5%. Furthermore, a one percent GDP growth is 
associated with 0.008 points on the democracy scale, quite similar to the effect of 10% 
more press freedom. With the average economic growth rate of 3%, the impact of GDP 
growth on democracy is two and a half times bigger than that of press freedom. Rule of 
law has a slightly lower effect than press freedom: 10% more rule of law is associated 
with 4% more democracy. Finally, government effectiveness has a negative sign, which 
we cannot explain, and a 3% parameter size. Table 10 summarizes the effects. 
 
 
Table 10. Summary results of a 0.10 increase in independent variables 
Model: 0.10 more PF 0.10 more 
CA 
1% more 
GDP 
0.10 more 
RL 
0.10 more 
GE 
Democracy + 0.05  +0.04 +0.04 -0.03 
 
 
Table 10 shows that the biggest effect of a ten percent increase in variables is from press 
freedom. But when economic growth is at its average of 3%, we need to multiply the 
GDP effect by 3, which gives 0.12. This effect, hence, is bigger than the effect of press 
freedom. Nevertheless, press freedom does appear to have a sizeable positive impact on 
the democracy score. In other words, press freedom, and not civic activism, appears to 
be instrumental for democracy. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The analysis of the relationship between independent media on the one hand and 
government accountability in service delivery on the other hand reveals several 
interesting points: 
 
 Press freedom and civic activism seem adequate complementary measures for the 
 40 
production and use of independent media 
 
 There is no substantive difference between the three available measures for press 
freedom, but the Freedom House measure has the most data 
 
 Of the two available measures for voice, Civic Activism (Indices of Social 
Development) is more adequate as a measure of the use of media than Voice and 
Accountability (Worldwide Governance Indicators) for the analysis of 
independent media and government accountability, because the last one includes 
press freedom and has a rather neoliberal character 
 
 Although some scatterplots suggest strong relatedness, the panel data 
multivariate estimations show that independent media has only limited effects on 
social accountability mechanisms such as rule of law, government effectiveness, 
and social expenditures, and only through civic activism, not press freedom 
 
 Press freedom has almost no effect on social accountability service delivery. Civic 
activism does have substantive effects, both in health and in education 
 
 Civic activism has a small and no statistically significant effect on political 
accountability, but press freedom does have a clear positive effect. 
 
 In comparison to economic growth and social expenditures, independent media 
has smaller effects on service delivery, but a slightly bigger effect than rule of law 
and government effectiveness 
 
In conclusion, the production of independent media (press freedom) has almost no effect 
on social accountability mechanisms and service delivery, whereas the use of independent 
media (civic activism) has clear effects on both. For political accountability, the results 
are the opposite. Press freedom, hence, the production of independent media, has a clear 
positive effect on political accountability, whereas civic activism, the use of independent 
media, does not. These results indicate that both press freedom and civic activism matter 
for government accountability. Press freedom seems important for democracy and civic 
activism seems instrumental for service delivery.   
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ANNEX 
 
Table A1. Time-lag model of health service delivery outcomes of social 
accountability 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate (1000 
live births) 
Under-5 
Mortality 
Rate (1000 
live births) 
Immunization 
DPT 
Immunization 
Measles 
PFt-1 10.39*** 22.63*** -0.072* -0.068* 
CAt-1 -36.75*** -71.15*** 0.342** 0.239* 
GDP -13.66*** -20.48*** 0.069*** 0.080*** 
RL -7.468 -14.84 0.019 -0.016 
EXPH -184.4*** -354.6*** 0.007 0.472 
GE 11.98 16.34 -0.051 0.015 
_cons 159.8*** 245.5*** 0.179* 0.150* 
N 440 440 440 440 
R-sq 0.50 0.41 0.20 0.22 
Note: p-values in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
Table A2. Time-lag model of education service delivery outcomes of social 
accountability 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Primary 
Completion 
Rate 
Pupil-
teacher 
Ratio, 
primary 
Pupil-teacher 
Ratio, 
secondary 
Primary 
Gross 
Enrolment 
Rate 
PFt-1 0.007 0.031 -0.022 -0.016 
CAt-1 0.044 -0.130 0.181** 0.986*** 
GDP 0.056*** -0.035*** -0.009 0.017 
RL -0.008 0.022 0.058 -0.095 
EXPE 0.196 -0.212 0.574* 2.672*** 
GE 0.009 0.129*** 0.094* 0.271** 
_cons 0.124*** 0.569*** 0.118* 0.261* 
N 241 272 166 271 
R-sq 0.79 0.27 0.13 0.26 
Note: p-values in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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